Category Archives: ISSSP Reflections

At the Gateway from East: Where do India’s Neighbours stand on the Belt and Road?

ISSSP Reflections No. 55, June 19, 2017

Author: Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh

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How do India’s neighbours look at the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of China? What is the current politico-economic framework in the Bangladesh-China, Nepal-China and Sri Lanka-China relations? What could be the possible opportunities and concerns when the Indian neighbourhood takes the new road with China? How do they intend to take the initiative forward?

Sino-centric bilateralism

 China’s tie with Bangladesh has been primarily one of friendly trade and defence cooperation. The International Trade Centre marks the commerce between the two States to be USD 12 billion in 2014 and estimated to exceed USD 30 billion by 2021. However, there seems to be a huge imbalance in trade, in terms of export-import between the two nations. The exports of Dhaka to Beijing seem to have not reached even a billion while on the flip side it enjoys duty free accessibility on a number of Chinese products. Bangladesh intends that the existing and growing imbalance could be tackled if China shows more interest to invest in Dhaka’s sunset industries and improve exports by sending the goods produced to Beijing.

Interestingly, Nepal faces a similar trade-deficit like Bangladesh, that is, the average export has remained at a very low rate compared to its imports with China, though, and trade relations among the duo have been at a steady rise. Nepal has not been able to fight the trade imbalance given the zero tariff entry it enjoys on a number of its goods primarily agro-products. Apart from this, geographical factors leading to poor connectivity have also been a major challenge to improve trade relations with Beijing. Nevertheless, China has been consistently making efforts to improve infrastructure on its part along the Nepal border. It has already connected a suburban plateau in Nepal through railroads.

Sri Lanka, on the other hand, has been receiving greater attention from China in recent times as the latter has been seeking to revive its ancient trade routes. This has improved the investment of Chinese Yuan in Sri Lanka. Even so, Colombo’s trade imbalance seems to be in line with other nations. The import from China accounted to USD 3,731.64 million while the imports barely remained at USD 293.05 million during 2015. Sri Lanka does not completely apprehend on this as Chinese imports of raw materials largely provide the foundation for Sri Lanka’s textile manufacturing and its export.

OBOR: Opportunities and Concerns

 The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative is largely seen as a gateway to expanded commerce by South Asian States. Small economics like Bangladesh and Nepal view OBOR as a prospective tool to improve the present infrastructural deficiencies which is vital for socioeconomic advancement. Dhaka, for instance, intends to meet its annual task of employment generation through the OBOR, which assures speedy growth and an extensive network of trade. Bangladesh also seeks to make use of her geographic position and work towards emerging as a major hub serving all the corridors along the OBOR. However, Dhaka seems concerned about how well it would be able to harness the opportunities to the fullest and reap benefits.

The unofficial border blockade by India has been a major factor which pushed Nepal into having extended ties with China and further into signing the OBOR. Kathmandu seems affirmative towards the initiative and like Bangladesh, Nepal also primarily views connectivity as one of the major breakthroughs to accelerate the economic engine. Kathmandu is a very recent entrant into business with China. It, therefore, becomes important for Nepal to keep a tab on the long term benefits it could gain from the initiative and also analyse on how the rest of  South Asia, especially smaller economies have been carrying their relationship with China forward.

Besides the geopolitical question, Sri Lanka, unlike the rest of her South Asian counterparts seems to remain in bigger dilemmas. The State is sceptical about its way forward due to the debt-laden projects with China it inherited from the previous government. Further, Colombo’s association with Beijing on the OBOR would mostly be on building infrastructure at the Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port for which Sri Lanka would have to respond to the queries of India on alleged Chinese expansion unto the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). But, the island already seems ready to tackle the risk.  Sri Lanka cannot underplay its ties with China, particularly at a time when it plans to move ahead with its projects.


Evidently, China’s motive might not be one of overt power projection along South Asia but covertly, it could also be in order to expand its defence capabilities by familiarising with the region in the first hand. India as a regional power seems to be drifting away from its neighbourhood. Recent policy shifts suggest that India might join hands with USA and Japan on infrastructure projects countering the OBOR. India as a major player in the Asia-Pacific region and China almost leading the superpower race today aggravates the challenges to which States like Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka could be exposed in the coming years. But, the prospects of a landmark initiative like the OBOR are undoubtedly humongous. It would not be wise of these States to let go of the enormous connectivity and trade opportunities the initiative pledges to offer. Nonetheless, small economies have to make sure that this win-win drive towards globalisation lets them extract optimally without pushing them to the Chinese laden debt-traps.

About the Author

Seetha Lakshmi Dinesh, Research Intern at ISSSP, NIAS.


Trump and the Broken Gulf: Will India be Able to Swim Through?

ISSSP Reflections No. 54, June 13, 2017

Author: Shreya Upadhyay

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In what has been termed as a step to “fight terrorism”, the three Global Corporation Council (GCC) countries– Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain- and Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Maldives recently announced their decisions to sever ties with Qatar accusing it for fomenting terrorist and sectarian groups, including the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. This article looks at the following: What is the US’ Response to the Crisis? Can this this lead to leadership change in Qatar? What role can India play in the recent Gulf Crisis? 

Trump’s Response to Gulf Crisis

Two weeks back, Trump’s speech in the Middle East demanded that Muslim states fight terror. The recent developments an therefore be termed as the first fallout of what is being referred to asTrump doctrine’. Still in its nascent stage, the doctrine espouses the US’ involvement in the war against extremist ideology and organisations in the region and those who back them. In this war, it seeks the support of Saudi and its allies, termed as the Arab NATO. The third and arguably the most pivotal aspect of the doctrine is confronting Iran—“the axis of evil”. The analysts have read it as an anti-Iran Sunni alliance bolstered by Israel’s participation.  

Trump during the visit firmly placed the US as a strategic ally of the Saudi Arabia. This was reversing Barack Obama’s policy of avoiding Middle East conflicts and a redialing of the Bush era. The US-Saudi alliance has picked up with more than $400 billion defence and other trade deals in the coming ten years.  For Saudis, who viewed Obama’s policies towards the region and especially Iran as a nightmare, Trump’s presence is a welcome step.  With US support, Saudi Arabia is confident to flex its muscles in the region and take on Iran.

However, for the United States it’s a sticky situation with Trump storm tweeting his praise on Saudi Arabia and allies for severing ties with Qatar and also taking credit for it while 11,000 US troops are housed in the island, considered one of the most crucial stations in fight against the ISIS, with B-52 bombers carrying out air strikes from the Al Udeid Base against ISIS supply warehouses in Iraq and Syria.

Towards Qatar’s Leadership Change?

Qatar’s maverick attitude in the region has always been an irritant for Saudi Arabia. However, in 2013 when the former emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa, handed over power to his son Sheikh Tamim, known to be close to Saudi royal court, many in the Gulf thought that this would lead to policies more in sync with that of the region. However, Qatar, with a total population of less than 3 million and a modest military force of 11,800 wants good working relations with all. It shares good ties with Iran, Israel as well as the US. Its ‘modern’ Wahhabist ideology is portrayed as accommodative and relatively open. In being the voice of reform, it backed Arab Spring and Moslem Brotherhood much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and allies. Qatar has also been bold in its support to Hamas and Hezbollah calling them “legitimate resistance movements”, which are often viewed by many, including the US, as terrorist organisations. Qatari media organisation Al Jazeera is also seen with skepticism by Arab governments and has been criticized often for its take on Moslem Brotherhood and Arab spring.

Just after Trump’s visit, Qatari media published remarks apparently given by emir Sheikh Tamim, with a pro-Iran stand and cautioning the Saudi kingdom to not become too dependent on Trump.  While Qatar denied making these comments emphatically stating that its news agency had been hacked, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the allies launched the diplomatic attack on the island nation.

Credibility of Qatar royal family to rule has also been vilified in the media that made public a letter signed by the 200 descendants of ibn Abdul Wahhab demanding the renaming of a Qatar mosque named after the 18th-century cleric even though most Qataris practice Wahhabism. There has been a questioning of the right of the royal family to rule the nation. It can therefore be said that pressure is being mounted on Qatar to change its posture to suit that of others in the region.

Back in 2014, Gulf states had withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar in an eight- month long diplomatic crisis. That had resulted in Qatar closing the al-Jazeera Mubashir of al-Jazeera network. However, this time the sanctions are much more crippling. The small country has been isolated with land, sea and air routes closed off. That will have repercussions on movement of people. Qatar imports almost 90 per cent food from outside, making it vulnerable to food and water insecurity. If the crisis continues there can be issues procuring infrastructure and construction material. Qatar’s shipping industry and ports, as well as its flagship air carrier, could face significant problems. Its banking system could come under major strain if foreign deposits are withdrawn.  

Should India Be Worried?

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj termed the development as an internal matter of the GCC and played down its impact stating that India has good ties with all regional rivals.

However, the region plays a strategic role for India. As much as 65 per cent oil comes from the region. New Delhi is the second largest buyer of Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG), after Japan. India’s Petronet LNG imports 8.5 million tonnes LNG from Doha every year.  As many as 6.5 million diasporic population is settled in the region with over half a million in Qatar alone sending almost $4billion dollars in remittances. India’s corporate sector too is increasingly pursuing business opportunities in Qatar. Companies, particularly in construction/infrastructure and IT, have operations in Qatar, L&T, Punj Lloyd, Shapoorji Pallonji, Voltas, to name a few.

The present Indian government has been working towards forging good strategic ties with the countries in the region. Not only trade and people, the recent years have seen enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia and UAE. Cooperation has been going on intelligence sharing and sending back people with Islamic State’s  links. Modi visited Qatar and hosted the Emir in New Delhi last year. However, the present situation brings out dilemma for New Delhi to act. In principal, it wants all parties at the negotiating table and would not want to take sides. Till now neither side has even tried using India as a leverage. However, this might not be the case in case the political crisis deepens.

About the Author

Shreya Upadhyay, Consultant at ISSSP, NIAS. She can be reached at <>

Trump’s End Game in Middle East

ISSSP Reflections No. 53, May 26, 2017

Author: Shreya Upadhyay

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US President Donald Trump first international nine-day tour comprises three major religious capitals of Islam, Judaism and Christianity. With that, he chose to plunge straight into the middle East politics with sit downs in Saudi Arabia, Israel and Palestine. This article looks at Trump’s first diplomatic mission and analyse the contours of his endgame in the Middle East.  

A Pan Arab, US, Israel Coalition: Targeting Tehran?

Trump’s perfectly tailored speech on “radical Islamic extremism in Saudi Arabia urged the Muslim countries to take lead in combating radicalisation.  The President also held separate session with leaders of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council to discuss the civil war in Syria and potential “de-escalation zones” to provide safe areas for civilians.  

In recent years, fears of a rising Iran have started to chip away at differences among Arab countries. Israel has also voiced her wish to improve ties with Saudi and other Gulf countries as part of an initiative that would draw Palestinians into a peace deal and create a broad front against Iran’s nuclear ambitions. During his visit Trump addressed major issues that are of immediate concern to the US. ISIS and other radical Islamist factions in the region remain a threat. However, Syria and Iran take remain of particular concern for the US. In his speeches he sent a strong message to Iran regarding its nuclear ambitions.  Interestingly, till now Trump has not ‘ripped up’ the Iran nuclear deal till now due to what the analysts see as reflecting business interests at home and diplomatic interests abroad.  However, Trump has accused Iran of funding, training and equipping terrorists and militias.  

Trump administration is taking up “Arab NATO” rather seriously and working towards closer security coordination between key Arab states and more burden-sharing to maintain the security of the region. A budding coalition of the United States, Israel and Arab leaders, largely arising from their shared view of Iran as a growing national security threat seems to be taking shape.                                                     

The Ultimate Israel- Palestine Peace Deal

The US President hammered the requirement of re-invigorating an Israel-Palestine peace process stating it was important for establish a common cause with the Arab neighbours in order to challenge Iran. It should be noted that even in the past, US Presidents ranging from Jimmy Carter to Obama have expressed confidence in their ability to bring the two sides together. Obama was certain that peace would occur under his watch that he told the United Nations in his 2010 address that it was possible the dream of a Palestinian state could be realized in the next year. The talks have, however, been moribund since 2014.

Trump during the visit avoided addressing thorny issues that have stalled peace efforts for decades. Instead, in his talks with the Israelis and Palestinians, he sought common sets of principles to build momentum for peace. However, his speech was missing specifics and bordered largely on rhetoric and goodwill.

The Israeli side was already miffed with revelations that the US president had shared sensitive intelligence with Russia. Another strain was backtracking on a campaign promise to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. However, that led to a fracas between American and Israeli officials planning for Trump’s visit. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked to join Trump on his visit of the Western Wall, but was snubbed. US officials declined to say whether the Western Wall belonged to Israel. Western Wall and the surrounding area holds an important place for the Israelis as well as the Palestinians. The US has withheld recognition of Israeli control of the area until there is a deal.

On paper, both Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas have made right noises about their readiness to negotiate. However, in reality they face domestic constraints on their freedom to manoeuvre. A peace deal still remains elusive till the five core issues (borders, security, Jerusalem, a right to return for refugees and mutual recognition) are not addressed.

Challenges to Trump’s Policy in Middle East

A new US president with a different foreign policy is a welcome step for the Middle Eastern leadership. Moreover, the region views Trump as someone not beholden to a particular ideology. That gives him some leeway and freedom. However, there are challenges to achieving the Arab-Israel peace and forging a regional security alliance against Iran and Syria.

  1. Regional Issues: One of the biggest issue for Trump is the distrust in the region. The level of disbelief between Israel and Palestine exists not only on the leadership level but also among the public. The Gaza war that started after the breakdown of the 2014 talks have worsened the situation. The issue of trust not only exists between Israel and Palestine but even within Palestine with the rift between Hamas, which controls Gaza, and Fatah, led by Abbas, growing deeper in recent months. Israel on its part is sceptical of the entire region. Till now the US ensured that Israel must maintain a ‘Qualitative Military Edge’ in the region and therefore constrained its military sales to Gulf. Trump’s recent $110 billion defence deal with Saudis is sure to attract grumblings of discontent among those in Tel Aviv.
  2. Russian Influence: In the past few years, Russia is reasserting its influence across the globe, including Middle East. The starting point was intervention in Syria where Russians have put boots on the ground. Other than that there is growing Russian involvement in several other Middle Eastern countries, including Turkey, Egypt and Israel with which the US had built strong ties over the decades. Russia is also coordinating with many of these countries against the ISIS. Netanyahu has made three visits to Moscow in the last two years and Putin has also tried to organise a summit between Israel and Palestine, an area traditionally dominated by the US. For the Trump administration, it is therefore crucial to strengthen ties with the region and find ways in which Russia and the US can collaborate on increasing the safety and security in the region. Notably, the US government were caught off guard with Putin’s presence in Ukraine and Syria. The US needs to be mindful of Russian activities in the regions such as weaponising Iran, and other activities to undermine US interests in the region.   
  3. Saudi Money: Analysts have questioned whether the Saudi kingdom is in a position to afford the deal thanks to its flailing economy due to volatile price of oil and massive deficits.  Saudi’s forex reserves are plummeting at an alarming rate due to plunge in oil prices. Even as the regime recognised conceded its weakness in the Vision 2030 unveiled last year, its spending of billions of dollars only shows economic lunacy and too impractical to be honoured.   
  4. Domestic Constraints: Trump took his first foreign trip amidst mushrooming domestic challenges. His public approval ratings continue to revolve around 40 per cent, a low mark for a new US President. However, he received a royal welcome from the middle eastern leadership and got some goodies to take back home as an example of Trump as a deal making President helping America domestically. However, the Trump administration may find congressional opposition to the some of the promised defence equipment, amounting to as high as $86 billion, that can be a source of instability in the region. 

About the Author

Shreya Upadhyay, Consultant at ISSSP, NIAS. She can be reached at <>

Kulbhushan Jadhav and the ICJ Verdict

ISSSP Reflections No. 52, May 25, 2017

Author: Anna Catherine

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The International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) in its order indicated provisional measures in the Jadhav case (India v. Pak) on May 18, 2017, which the Indian media celebrated as a diplomatic victory. Notwithstanding Indian show of legal expertise in Hague, the military court of Pakistan could go ahead and carry out the execution of Jhadav in defiance of the ICJ’s order. This leads to two pertinent questions; (i) Will Pakistan budge? (ii) Is the execution of Mr. Jhadav inevitable?

This case is of paramount significance in understanding recent engagement of India with Pakistan as the former has moved the international court for the first time in forty- six years. India instituted proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan alleging violations of the VCCR (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). Mr. Jhadav was given death sentence by the military court of Pakistan and in the process denied him consular access guaranteed by the VCCR to which both disputing states are parties. India in its application sought for interim relief by way of restitution in integrum i.e restoration to original condition and premised its request on the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court and Article I of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.

At this preliminary stage, the court order does not verify the credentials of the claims of either parties; and has merely indicated ‘provisional measures’ i.e, to withhold the execution until the final judgement based on the merits of the case.

Pakistan’s arguments.

Pak’s request for rejection of India’s application is based on three major arguments;

  • First, Pakistan argues that ICJ has no jurisdiction over a bilateral dispute involving ‘espionage’ and ‘security threat’.
  • The second argument is based on the ‘urgency’ of the case. The fact that the date of execution is not determined and the provision of the convict to seek clemency under Pakistan’s domestic law indicates that a court order indicating provisional measures is unnecessary at this point in time.
  • Third, unavailability of provisions under VCCR for the  reversal of the sentence.

The Court’s reasoning

The Court first considered whether it has jurisdiction prima facie to hear the case. India has sought ICJ involvement by invoking Article 1 of the Optional Protocol which reads, “disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention are within the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.” Thus the court observed that the allegations made by India i.e, failure of Pakistan to provide the requisite consular notifications and denial of communication and access to Jadhav, appear to be capable of falling within the scope of the Convention.

Another point that emerged in the case was the 2008 Indo – Pak bilateral agreement on consular access. It excludes detentions and arrests on grounds of ‘political and security concerns’ from the general principle of consular access that applies otherwise. In this case the court observed that the 2008 agreement does not change its conclusion on jurisdiction. Nevertheless, certain commonwealth countries enjoy exceptions in accepting compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ based on certain treaties and declarations. Pakistan, on the previous night of Jhadhav’s death sentence, modified its 1960 declaration to limit compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ under Article 36(2). As India has sought ground of jurisdiction under Article 36(1), the modified declaration did not affect the Indian case at this stage.

With regard to the ‘urgency’ argument, Pakistan had given no assurance that Mr. Jadhav will not be executed before the Court has rendered its final decision. Going by precedents set by ICJ in earlier cases, an undetermined date for execution was no case to preclude indication of provisional measures. Thus the court ruled having found a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by India.

Will Pakistan budge?

With a stay of the execution of Jhadav in place, what is yet to be seen is Pakistan’s response. Will Pakistan continue the domestic trial of Kulbhushan Jhadav and execute him in defiance of ICJ? 

It is to be noted that Pakistan consented to the case being heard at the International court and sent its representation to Hague and asserted the Pak side of the argument. Had Pakistan not been optimistic of a favourable outcome out of international arbitration, it would have made no effort to present a strong case at all. Pakistan prepares to challenge the jurisdiction in another hearing in Hague soon. If it’s natural choice was to defy any form of international mediation it would make no effort to challenge the current court order. The nature of Pakistani state’s participation in the dispute’s hearing is a harbinger of its hopefulness to draw world attention to India’s activities within its borders. Hence, non- compliance and belligerence would not be Pakistan’s first choice.

On the contrary, in case of a harsh stance of Pakistani military as its policy towards India, it could follow the precedent set by United States by defying ICJ in the persecution of three foreign nationals citing its court’s predominance over a national affair. Although a possibility, it is unlikely due to several reasons. The recent leaks in the newspaper “Dawn” indicated a civil – military rift within Pakistan on several issues, Kulbhushan Jhadav being one of them. The controversial meet of Indian businessman Jindal with Prime Minister Nawas Sharif, following which India made its application in ICJ is speculated as divergence of the civilian government and Pakistani military on its issues with India. Pakistani newspapers reported soon after the ICJ hearing that confidante of Sharif brothers mentioned their willingness to accept ICJ ruling. In addition, Pakistan Punjab government contradicted the Foreign Office and said the country will accept the verdict of the Hague. With such differences within the state an outright defiance of international law is unlikely.

Is execution inevitable?

It is important to distinguish the court’s involvement in the preliminary stage from the assessment of the merits of the case. The ICJ in similar cases earlier have limited its judgement to “review and reconsideration by the detaining state”. Unavailability of an ultimate relief under the convention limits the reach of ICJ. However, if Pakistan continues to challenge the jurisdiction of ICJ over the issue, it would pose an opportune for India to delay the proceedings indefinitely, averting execution of Jhadav. In the absence of precise treaty obligation, India could use its diplomatic flair to settle the dispute out of court, bilaterally with Pakistan once a sense of fatigue and exhaustion sets in the struggle.

On the other hand, if Pakistan manages to develop its arguments along the proceedings of the court and build a strong case of ‘espionage’ and ‘national security threat’ against India, the outcome will be drastically different. The onus is upon India to be prepared for a battle to defend its morale and international reputation.

About the Author

Anna Catherine, Post Graduate Scholar, Christ University & Research Intern, ISSSP, NIAS. She can be reached at <>

Terrorism and Violence in Pakistan: Understanding their Mind

ISSSP Reflections No. 51, March 18, 2017

Author: Niveditha RM

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During last month, there were a series of terror attacks in Punjab, Khyber Paktunkhwa and Sindh, claiming more than 100 lives.

Print and Social media were full of opinions on what the problems are in Pakistan and how could they be addressed. This commentary focuses on how the Pakistanis perceive terrorism, violence and the fallouts. What do they consider as the major cause and what do they see as a possible solution?

Afghanistan and Pakistan border problems: A major cause

Most in Pakistan consider failure to address the Afghanistan issue as a primary problem for violence and terror inside Pakistan.

A section consider that Afghan policies of Pakistan and supporting militants in the past as a reason for the recent attacks. A section also question the efficacy of the National Action Plan  A commentator wrote: “For decades- dating back to the Mujahideen – our (Pakistan) chief export to Afghanistan has been militancy. The Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, whether by neglect or more likely design, were low on our list of priorities. Yet we managed to summon up outrage over the leadership of TTP finding safe refuge in Afghanistan. As ye sow, so shall ye reap?”

A section within Pakistan is worried about the policies being pursued by Pakistan to address the issue. This section considers that there are no new steps and what is being done currently is the repeat of the past. This perception also underlines the failure of National Action Plan in a comprehensive manner.

A section questions the distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ militant groups have prolonged the strategic decisions.

Another section looks at the failure in developing a stable diplomatic relations with Kabul. This section propagates that the army has conducted multiple military operations internally but has failed to establish friendly ties with Afghanistan. The civil and military establishments both have failed to develop effective and productive cooperation . A section also considers that the Afghan indifference terror attacks in Pakistan as another major problem.

A section also feels the growing strength of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) in the Afghan-Pak borders as a primary reason for the recent surge in violence. Of course, there are multiple strains within this thought process. While a section considers that the geography is conducive for this TTP presence in the border regions, another section accuses Afghanistan for either not taking action against the militants or coluding with them. Most in Pakistan believe that the sanctuaries and safe haven that TTP have in Afghanistan is a primary reason for the continuing attacks. 

The India Factor

Few in Pakistan also consider India as a factor behind the recent surge. They project the following reasons for India supporting terrorism in Pakistan.

Undermining the CPEC: There is a general perception in Pakistan that India is unhappy with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and has been trying to sabotage it. Pakistan Foreign Office spokes person Nafees Zakaria urged the international community to take action against India, blaming for the terror attacks in Pakistan. Pakistan Muslim League-N  Central Information Secretary Mushahidullah Khan commented that India has carried out the attacks fearing the CPEC progress. And Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah claimed India’s hand behind the attacks. This section considers that the CPEC would help Pakistan’s economic progress which India wants to undermine.

India using Afghanistan as a Proxy: Many within Pakistan consider that India is using Afghanistan as a proxy to destabilize the country. India is held responsible for the sour relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This section considers that India wants to use Afghanistan as a proxy on Pakistan’s western border and continue sot support terrorist attacks. This section also claimed that the RAW is trying to impose on Pakistan using terror as a tool.

Bringing bad reputation to Pakistan:  A section in Pakistan also consider that India support terrorism to bring bad reputation to the country. This section consider that a series of encouraged by the RAW are engaged in creating this bad image at the international level. Few even linked with the Pakistan Super League’s final to be held in Lahore at that time – that India wanted to undermine that!

Looking inward

Of course, not every one in Pakistan blame the outsiders for their internal problem. Some consider militancy problem in Punjab as an issue, which is yet to be acknowledged by the political leaders. PML-N has not focused adequately and not provided institutional support to counter the militant threat. A section criticizes government’s opposition to military operations in the region.

Few criticize the NAP; they consider it has goals, objectives and vision but lacks plan. According to them, the number of terrorists killed and refugees deported is impressive but is meaningless. It has become reference point for every counter-terrorism action.  

Small sections do consider that the problem is being externalized. For this section, the policy challenges need to be focused on long term benefits.

Will Pakistan look inward as well to counter terrorism and combat future attacks? Or will it continue to blame the outsiders?

About the Author

Niveditha RM is a Research Intern with ISSSP, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru. She can be reached at <>

The Husain Huqqani Revelation: Did the Civilians keep the Military in dark on OBL?

ISSSP Reflections No. 50, March 14, 2017

Author: D Suba Chandran

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Did the civilian administration of Pakistan during Zardari’s tenure gave intelligence information to the US on Osama bin Laden’s presence in the country, leading to the latter’s killing? Was the Pakistani military establishment kept out of picture in this Islamabad-Washington collusion? Did Husain Huqqani, then the Pakistani Ambassador to US facilitate this?

In his recent commentary published in the Washington Post, Husain Huqqani former Pakistani Ambassador to the US during 2008-11 (Obama-Zardari period) has touched a raw nerve that is likely to echo within Pakistan and in the policy circles elsewhere in the next few weeks.

There is nothing astonishing in his claim that he forged a relationship during Obama’s campaign itself (Huqqani was at the Hudson Institute in Washington and teaching at Boston before he was appointed as Pakistani Ambassador) helping him to build a closer cooperation between Pakistan and US. But what follows is a chocker; he claims, “These connections eventually enabled the United States to discover and eliminate bin Laden without depending on Pakistan’s intelligence service or military, which were suspected of sympathy toward Islamist militants.” (emphasis added) According to Huqqani, the US and the civilian administration in Pakistan could manage tracking OBL without the help of the ISI or the military, through the stationing of “US Special Operations and intelligence personnel on the ground in Pakistan.”

Huqqani also reveals that the US kept Pakistan “officially out of the loop about the operation…when Obama decided to send in Navy SEAL Team 6 without notifying Pakistan.” If the above is true, then one can conclude the military operation against the OBL was owned and executed by the US without the knowledge of the civilian and military establishments of Pakistan. But it also underlines another important point: the civilian administration may not be aware of the OBL operation, but was well aware of the hunt for Osama. According to Huqqani, the civilian administration in Pakistan in fact helped it, by facilitating the presence of the Special Operations and intelligence personnel of the US in Pakistan.

The above facilitation leads to another interesting question – if the civilian administration in Pakistan and its Ambassador to the US had worked closely with the Americans in finding Osama, why blame only Dr Shakil Afridi, who is now in prison for doing the same? (Dr Afridi is now in prison for helping the CIA to locate OBL through a vaccine programme)

Why did Zardari and Huqqani decide to work closely with the US? And why did they keep military outside the loop?

For Huqqani, the need to work with the US was crystal clear. According to him, he was appointed by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, who had “wanted to end Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, improve relations with India and Afghanistan, and limit the role of Pakistan’s military intelligence service in defining the country’s foreign policy”. (Emphasis added) In return, “they sought generous US aid to improve the ailing Pakistani economy.”

The above pursuit of the PPP government clearly underlines its original objectives, intended road map and possible threats. More than ending the support for the Taliban and improving relations with Kabul and New Delhi, for Islamabad the primary objective then should have been to restart the US civilian aid to Pakistan. Perhaps, this should have led Zardari, Gilani and Huqqani to work closely with the US. President Obama was willing to open the civilian aid, provided Pakistan addressed American concerns – action against the Taliban, improved relations with India and Afghanistan, and intelligence against the al Qaeda leadership, especially Osama bin Laden.

It was no coincidence that the drone programme led by the CIA, peaked during this period. The drones were effectively used by the US in the FATA region targeting and neutralizing militants belonging to the Taliban and al Qaeda during Zardari-Obama tenure. Though the drones were in operation even during Bush-Musharraf period, it peaked subsequently under the Obama administration.

The crucial question in this context – if what Huqqani claims is true, why did the Zardari team decide to work with the US, keeping Gen Kayani outside the loop? There could be two explanations; first, the Zardari team did not trust the military and its ISI in reshaping Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Second, perhaps the PPP government wanted to use the opportunity to undermine the role of military in Pakistan’s decision making process.

To be fair to Pakistan’s military, it did help the CIA in pursuing militant leaders within Pakistan – especially belonging to the al Qaeda and its affiliates. Raids did take place all over Pakistan and numerous al Qaeda leaders were either nabbed or killed in those operations. However, this was more a tactical move, than a strategic shift in Pakistani military’s approach towards Taliban and al Qaeda. While they were willing to work with the US, it was a limited cooperation; on the other hand, the US expected a complete turnaround in Pakistan’s approach towards these groups.

The larger reason for the Zardari team’s attempt to build a strategic link with the US administration should have been internal political equation within Pakistan. The military establishment and its ISI never trusted the PPP; certainly not Zardari. The latter was a shrewd politician to be aware of this and realize that the long term challenge for the PPP will always come from the khakis. However, to undermine or even limit the role of military in decision making – there is neither political consensus with other major parties, nor a public support against military intervention in politics. Zardari would have wanted to use the American support to keep the military away from crucial decision making process.

Perhaps such a thought process got further strengthened in the immediate aftermath of Osama’s killing in Abbotabad. Zardari and Huqqani would have calculated that Osama’s presence close to a military installation and the American raid deep into Pakistani territory would have shamed and undermined the predominant role of Pakistan’s military and the public perception towards it. The “Memogate” episode (where Huqqani was supposed to have authored a memo for the Americans to support the political process in Pakistan by undermining the military) post OBL killing underlines the above.

Unfortunately for Zardari and Huqqani, the public perception did not go fully against the military. The latter did not get “shamed” as was expected with OBL’s presence and the American raid. Rather, the ghairat brigade in Pakistan went after the Americans for violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. Huqqani was subsequently made the villain and was forced to resign for colluding with the Americans.

So, what has changed?

Of course, much has changed since then. There is a new Prime Minister in Islamabad and the government is led by the PML-N and not the PPP. There is a new Army Chief in Pakistan; Gen Bajwa has replaced Gen Sharif who had earlier succeeded Gen Kayani. There is a new Pakistani Ambassador to the US; Huqqani had to resign following the “Memogate” though he is continuing in the US as an academic and is persona non grata in Pakistan. More importantly, there is a new President in the White House.

But, do these changes mean anything substantial to the ground relations and issues? Though there would be a new foreign secretary in Pakistan, the foreign policy vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan will be shaped more by the GHQ. There has been an emphasis within Pakistan to reshape its approach towards Afghanistan and militancy; it did not take place during Gen Sharif’s period and is too soon judge on how Gen Bajwa would respond.

The military is well entrenched in political decision making; if the civilian establishment has to consider taming the military through external support it would be a futile approach, as Huqqani would have realised by now. Neither can the Parliament bulldoze the military through political strength, as Nawaz Sharif attempted in the late 1990s. The media is vibrant and so is the civil society; if the liberal and democratic section is getting stronger, the other side is also equally active and politically powerful, especially on the streets.

The military is unlikely to give up its predominant position. The political parties should attempt to strengthen themselves, by expanding their popular support and the interactions between them both in the Parliament and outside it, through a democratic culture. The jalsa politics, especially led by Imran Khan is disruptive and is unlikely to strengthen the position of political parties and the Parliament. The Panama politics now and the Islamabad agitations in 2014 would reveal that the problem lies elsewhere. And it cannot be addressed by getting the American support.

The civil-military relations in Pakistan will have to evolve from within. The military may have an edge to take outside support, or use external environment to strengthen its position. The civilian institutions will have to look inwards to strengthen their position. For the political parties, support and strength come from their people; that is where they should aim at.

About the Author

Dr. D. Suba Chandran is Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru. He can be reached at <>

Tehmina Janjua: Internal Challenges for the New Foreign Secretary

ISSSP Reflections No. 49, February 27, 2017

Author: D Suba Chandran

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Tehmina Janjua, when she takes over the Foreign Secretary in March 2017, will become Pakistan’s first woman Foreign Secretary. Her challenges are numerous – both within Pakistan (especially vis-a-vis foreign policy decision making structure) and outside – especially with big powers such as the US and immediate neighbours – India, Afghanistan and Iran. Besides the above, she will also have to face rest of the international community – in addressing Pakistan’s negative image.

There seems to be an extra focus (though unfair) in the media on she being the first “woman” foreign secretary. Perhaps, it may have played a role in the decision making, as an image building exercise at the international level. There is likely to be a series of changes in the next few weeks. Pakistan’s serving foreign secretary Aizaz Chaudhry will be replacing the present Ambassador to the US. Abdul Basit, Pakistan’s High Commissioner was expected to replace Aizaz, but the Prime Minister seem to have opted for Tehmina Janjua.

Tehmina’s track record is substantial; she is a highly experienced diplomat with so much understanding at the international levels. She has worked extensively with the United Nations and currently she has been Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva. She was earlier the spokesperson for the external ministry and has served as Ambassador to Italy from December 2011 to October 2015.

There have been women diplomats in Pakistan, highly decorated, efficient and successful, for example Maleeha Lodhi. Maleeha, though not a career diplomat, is currently Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York; earlier she has served as Pakistan’s High Commissioner to the UK and Ambassador to the US.

Tehmina may not have served as an Ambassador in the region, but has enough international experience. The real issues however, for Tehmina will not be related to whether she has served in the neighbourhood or not. There are serious domestic and international challenges that she would be inheriting. Especially the domestic challenges that would restrict her functioning, is the focus of this short commentary.

It is not easy to be a Foreign Secretary in South Asia in the first place. Given the political decision making process, role and actual position of the Prime Minister/President and bilateral relations with the neighbours and big powers – the position of foreign secretary in the region has always been challenging. In India, the situation has been improving since the 1998 nuclear tests; starting from Shyam Saran, there have been a series of Foreign Secretaries, who have been able to discharge the functions expected of the external ministry.

In Pakistan, there are additional challenges to the Foreign Secretary. First and foremost is the decision making process and the actors involved in it. Though in a democracy, Parliament and elected representatives led by the Prime Minister is expected to play a predominant role in shaping country’s foreign policy, this has not been the case in Pakistan. The military has been playing a powerful role not only in foreign policy decision making, but also on Pakistan’s strategic assets and their developments. Shaping the relations with the neighbourhood and the big powers – especially the US and China has remained more with the GHQ than with the Parliament and External Ministry.

Second, the GHQ would prefer complete control over foreign policy especially vis-a-vis Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood. Perhaps, that could be a reason also to choose Tehmina, as she has enormous international exposure, than any substantial experience in the immediate neighbourhood. For Tehmina, the above would be the biggest challenge, which her predecessors also inherited.

Third, added to the above restriction is the absence of a full time foreign minister. Nawaz Sharif for reasons best known to him has not appointed a full time foreign minister and has been running the external relations through Special Advisors, in this case Sartaj Aziz.

Though Sartaz Aziz is extremely capable, he is not the “Foreign Minister” chosen from one of the elected representatives of the Parliament. Special Advisor may enjoy a cabinet position, but it is not equivalent to being a Foreign Minister. The protocol conscious diplomatic community should be well aware of the difference.

One could also argue, foreign minister in Pakistan is more symbolic. Hina Rabbani was the last foreign minister of Pakistan and the media, especially social media was highly critical of her.

Finally, the biggest domestic challenge with huge international ramification – militancy and militant groups. While the foreign ministry in Pakistan may have no access, leverage or control over the militant groups within Pakistan, the diplomats will be at the receiving end at the international level – both fire fighting and image building. Even for the Pakistani Ambassador to China, with whom they share an “all weather relationship” that is “higher than the Himalayas” and “deeper than the Oceans” (and now “sweeter than honey”), it would not be an easy task to defend Pakistan’s image and policies relating to militancy.

Worse, for the foreign ministry of Pakistan, they would not be privy to the larger interaction between the political leadership, military and ISI on the use and abuse of militant groups as a strategic asset on Pakistan’s eastern and western borders. As a result, their envoys serving in New Delhi, Kabul and Tehran may not be fully aware of the larger calculations behind actual developments along the borders. The foreign secretary, at times may know about the border developments and Pakistan’s response from his or her envoys in the neighbouring countries than from his or her own Parliament!

All the best Tehmina Janjua. Given the inherent limitations, we sincerely wish, you take proactive measures to stabilise the LoC, strengthen it further with pursuing the earlier agreements between two parts of J&K, and normalise Pakistan’s relationship with India. Hope you bring a new perspective and a change as well across the Wagah.

 About the Author

Dr. D. Suba Chandran is Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru. He can be reached at <subachandran[at]>

The “Not Now, Not Ever” Lady: Amb. Arundhati Ghose R.I.P

ISSSP Reflections No. 49, August 01, 2016

Author: D. Suba Chandran 

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Arundhati GhoseThe last time I spoke with Ambassador Arundhati Ghose was in April 2016. A team from the ISSSP at the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) including Prof. Rajaram Nagappa and Prof. S. Chandrashekar were to visit New Delhi to discuss few projects with the government and think tanks in Delhi. Amb. Ghose, being a part of the NIAS, we approached her to be a part of the ISSSP delegation. She responded with a short note informing about her cancer.  After reaching Delhi I called her to enquire about her health without realizing that it would be my last correspondence with an Institution.

An Institution – she was. Those who worked with her in the MEA and other senior scholars who interacted with her in the various seminar circuits would vouch for it. And more importantly, for those young scholars, who had the opportunity to know her, listen to her and interact with her. I was one of those fortunate ones.

While she was known for her “Not Now, Not Ever” crisp remark about India not signing the CTBT and her strong diplomatic projection of India’s interests, she was also a great human being, scholar and a mentor.

I met her first, when I was a part of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS); I had the privilege of working closely with her. She took part in the seminars and conferences that I organised on nuclear issues, was a regular part of the workshops especially for young scholars, and also the track-II dialogues we held.

She was thorough and very methodical in her approach. She would always come prepared for her lectures, with a detailed and elaborate written note. In advance, she would check how much time she would have for her presentation – and ensure that she sticks to the time allotted – whether 8-10 minutes as a part of a panel, or a full length lecture in 20-30 minutes. She would be precise and ensure she covers her ground.

If only she had picked up a teaching assignment after her retirement, she would have become a great teacher and mentor to many young scholars. However, she compensated for it by taking time to be with them, whenever we organised workshops for young scholars. She was a regular faculty for those 3-5 days nuclear workshops we organised; she ensured that she spent enough time with the young scholars. One could see the students and scholars surrounding her during tea and lunch/dinner. Her lunch and dinner tables will always be crowded with the young scholars during those workshops and the only thing that would distract her would be her urge to smoke.

Many of us wished and even spoke about her smoking. She would give us a pat on our shoulders, wink at us and pretend that the question was never put to her. Or, she would change the subject. Diplomat, wasn’t she?

There were few occasions that we had to request her to be a discussant for the draft essays of young scholars, including an intern. She would always be willing and spend the same amount of time, which she would otherwise spend with the seniors. She would take every work seriously; who has authored it – junior or senior would not matter. A thorough professional.

More than that, she was a great human being. Inside the conference/meeting halls, there would be a serious debate and disagreement, but she would never let those academic differences affect her personal relationships. Outside the conference table, she would be friendly and smiling, of course politely telling that she did not agree.

She was also fond of her pets. She would not let me referring “them” to dogs or cats. It is always a “he” or a “she”, and would refer they by the name. She would even be willing to skip the lunch, if she has to take her pets to the veterinarian.

We all will miss you. Ma’am.

About the Author

Dr. D. Suba Chandran is Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bengaluru. He can be reached at <subachandran[at]gmail[dot]com>

Defence Research and Development (R&D) in Israel: An Overview

ISSSP Reflections No. 48, July 27, 2016

Author: Vishakh K. Valiathan 

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As history has shown us time and again, technological advances have had a huge impact on the conduct of warfare. This can be traced back from the adoption of saddle and stirrup for the cavalry, to the invention of gunpowder, to the present day automatic machine guns and development of nuclear weapons. Realpolitik demands that in order to survive in an anarchical world, a state needs to build up its military and economic power.

Technological prowess therefore is crucial in giving the country that slight edge over its adversaries. This has been the reason that countries and companies have relentlessly pursued development (R&D) of newer technology and invested time and money into research and development in the security sector. Innovation is important for sustainable development and it brings in new processes, services and systems that show the essential investment in any area. Israel’s investment into R&D has catalysed the growth of its civilian and defence industries which have in turn complemented its emergence as a technologically modern and prosperous nation. It can be noted that countries view spending on Defence Research and Development (R&D) as an investment for the future and a guarantor of their security.

Israeli Spending on Defence

From the time the state of Israel was created in 1948, it has experienced various security challenges. The geo-political situation in Israel’s neighbourhood has been hostile to say the least. The country from its experiences acknowledged that its continued existence could be secured only through a strong military, economy and pursuit of technological prowess. Israel’s small geographical and demographic footprint – as compared to other countries in the region – also resulted in Israeli political leadership giving importance to technical education and achieving technological superiority. Israel, in the present era, is known for its R&D in defence equipment and products. Some of the companies of Israel are the best in developing hi-tech innovative products for the defence sector complementing the civilian sector.

As Dov Dvir and Asher Tishler recount in their book The Changing Role of the Defense Industry in Israel’s Industrial and Technological Development, from the 1950s onwards (see Chapter 10), Israel has been playing a pivotal role in the innovation of defence products and equipment,  focus on aerospace, cyber and naval systems. These developments have benefited the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), have created valuable friends and allies and earned much needed foreign exchange. Given the fact that Israel is not well endowed with natural resources, it chose to bank upon its highly educated population and steered its economy into a self-sufficient one, based on employment of high-end technologies. Innovation and creation of hi-tech industries accelerated the path for the Israeli defence sector to become global leaders in R&D beginning from the 1960s and 1970s. The 1970s witnessed an influx of high technology into the civilian industry and paved the way for defence R&D in the areas of sensors, electro-optics, information gathering systems etc. The flow chart in Figure 1 below shows the different phases of Israeli defence industry since the mid-1950s.


Figure 1: Phases of Israeli Defence Industry (1950-Current)

From Figure 2 below, it is clear that the Israeli government spends highly on military expenditure, which has been seen as a necessity given its multifarious security threats. Military expenditure accounted for 14.1% of total government expenditure in 2013, grew to 14.9% in 2014 and came down to 13.2% in 2015 which is similar to 2012 figures. Over the years, Israel has spent a fair share of its total government spending in beefing up its defence. This has resulted in the development of many innovative products, especially in the small arms industry, lasers, radars, drones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) and personal equipment. Israel is also the world leader in surface bound equipment.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Israeli Investment into R&D

The Gross Domestic Product of Israel in 2015 was US$ 296.075 Billion. The economy is expected to grow at 3.4% in 2018 as compared to the present rate of 2.82% in 2016. Israel is among the world’s top ten countries partly also due to the quality in its R&D and innovation. The provision of basic R&D and venture capital is largely dispensed by the Academic and Research Institutes. Hi-tech industries and defence firms too have played their part in the development process. They accounted for 37% of the industrial product in 1965, which grew to 58% in 1985 and has currently reached close to 70%. In 2014, Israeli Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D was US$ 10,358 Million.

Source: OECD

Source: OECD

Israel is amongst the top countries in the high income OECD list in terms of R&D investment with a 4.1% R&D share of GDP in 2014. From Figure 3 above, it can be seen that there is a high demand for research and technology in the nation.

Israeli Defence R&D: Focus Areas

Research & Development efforts carried out by Israeli defence firms result in development of products which are useful for both civilian and defence sectors. Using the SIBAT-International Defence Cooperation 2015-16 defence directory it is possible to glean the major products and areas of R&D in Israel’s defence industry. The major focus areas are:-

  • Aerospace: Aircraft manufacturing, maintenance, Upgrading and Retrofit, Avionics and Airborne Equipment, Simulation and pilot training solutions, helicopter upgrading, Electronic Warfare and countermeasures, Drones, Space Technology and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).
  • Naval Forces: Naval craft and shipborne equipment, Naval defence and attack systems, Sonar systems, Simulation and training.
  • Land Forces: Tanks and armored combat vehicles, force protection-active protection, personal protection gear, border protection, artillery, Electronic warfare and counter measures, infantry equipment, Dry storage, Military vehicles, Small arms, Demolition, Explosive Ordnance disposal and mine cleaning, Air Defence (AD) systems, aerostat systems.
  • Unmanned Systems & Robotics: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Unmanned Ground Vehicle, robots.
  • C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computing& Intelligence): Military Communications-Systems and Equipment, C4I, Intelligence.
  • Optronics: Day/Night E.O. Systems and Lasers, Missile components, Airborne E.O. Pods, Thermal Imaging.
  • Electronic Components & Sub-Systems: Navigation.
  • Services: Defence Consultants &Training, Design, Engineering & planning.
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

It is very apparent from Figure 4 above, that the Israeli efforts in R&D have given the country and its firms a technological and competitive advantage. Majority of the military products and equipment that are exported, especially sensors, missiles and aircraft, have received sizeable inputs from R&D efforts. Israel is also a major exporter of defence services. Indo-Israeli defence cooperation has been growing in recent years, with India becoming one of the main importers of Israeli defence products in addition to setting up joint ventures with Israel.


Since its creation in 1948, Israel has been confronted with multiple security risks, which has resulted in the country’s leaders giving a lot of attention to R&D in the defence and hi-technology sectors. Statistics from the OECD and SIPRI illustrate the technological prowess that Israel has successfully achieved since the late 1970s. The investment into R&D has also contributed to the country’s economy by way of higher defence exports. This technological edge has offset Israel’s disadvantages emanating from its limited geographical landmass and population. The Israeli nation has invested a large amount of financial and human resources in building up military and technical competence to shield itself from the internal and external security threats.

 About the Author

Vishakh K. Valiathan is a Post-Graduate Student pursuing his Masters in International Relations from the School of Social Sciences and International Studies, Pondicherry University. He can be reached at <vishakh94[at]>

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Ambassador Arundhati Ghose: In Memoriam

Bangalore, July 26, 2016

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The news about the demise of Ambassador Arundhati Ghose came as a rude shock for all of us in the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme at National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Bangalore. Ambassador Ghose had shared with us that she was not well and was undergoing treatment. Nothing however, can prepare one for the deep sense of loss and pain one suffers after the loss of a close friend and confidant.

Amb Ghose

Amb. Arundhati Ghose delivering the Inaugural K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture at NIAS, Bengaluru

Ambassador Ghose had a long and distinguished career in the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) having joined the IFS in 1963. However, what she is most remembered and idolised for was her leadership of the Indian delegation as India’s Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament during the CTBT negotiations. Our stand on signing the CTBT was taken in the PMO when Deve Gowda was PM, and communicated by her in her immortal words: “Not now. not ever.” Her steely resolve and courage to withstand the enormous global pressure and commitment to protect Indian national interests during the CTBT negotiations earned her the well deserved moniker of ‘Calcutta Kali.’

In December 2015, she had been gracious enough to pen her reflections on this important chapter in India’s modern diplomatic history in her address to senior scientists from various Indian scientific establishments at the NIAS-DST Training Programme on “Policy for Science and Science for Policies” held at NIAS, Bangalore on November 19, 2015. The text of this lecture is available on the ISSSP website.

Very early into her career as a Foreign Service officer, Ambassador Ghose was also posted to Kolkata in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry of External Affairs to liaise with Bangladesh leaders in Mujibnagar during 1971. She worked in various capacities in the Embassies of India in Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium ; and as Ambassador of India to the Republic of Korea, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNESCO; Ambassador of India to Egypt ; Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to UN Offices in Geneva, and the Conference on Disarmament.  She was in charge of Economic Relations in the Ministry of External Affairs in 1990-91. During her illustrious career, she was also Member/Chairperson, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament (1998-2001); and Member of the Union Public Service Commission (1998-2004). She was a member of Pugwash India, and was on the editorial board of Disarmament Times (New York) and Faultlines (New Delhi). She was recently elected member of the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.

An Adjunct Faculty of NIAS, Ambassador Ghose was a true well wisher of NIAS and more than a friend to all of us at the ISSSP. We could rely on her for sound and sagacious advice and benefited from her feedback on more than one occasion. Amb. Ghose visited NIAS, probably for the first time during the two day National Workshop on “Changing Contours of Indo-US Relations” held at NIAS on February 9-10, 2006. She also visited NIAS as member of the Task Force on Non-proliferation and Disarmament chaired by the late K. Subrahmanyam. In April 2011, Ambassador Ghose delivered the inaugural (full text of lecture) K. Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture on ‘Emerging India: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities’ at NIAS on April 13, 2011. She also seeded the idea of holding the National Workshop on Advanced Techniques in Environmental Monitoring at NIAS on September 25-26, 2014 and ensured that representatives from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) participated in the Workshop.

More than anything else Ma’am, we will miss your acerbic wit and infectious laugh that would fill up the entire room.

All of us at ISSSP pray for the peace of the departed soul. Rest in Peace.

Condolence Messages 

It is a sad day – for me – Got to know her only after I came here – she came for the NIAS organized workshop on the Indo US Nuclear deal – got to know her then – came as a part of the K.Subramanian committee to NIAS – made a presentation on our work – later learnt that she had supported our programme and contributed to our initial funding – she became a good friend – wise and sagacious – helped us do the workshop on detection of nuclear events – Also read about how she dealt with the CTBT negotiations in Geneva – there is a UNIDIR publication that documents the negotiations in detail – got to admire her courage integrity and guts in standing up to the superpowers of the world.

I will miss her and her indomitable spirit.

Prof. S. Chandrashekar, JRD Tata Chair Professor, NIAS

Arundati’s representation of the Indian position is already the stuff of folklore. One salutes her as a powerful diplomatic asset, patriotic without a trace of jingoism.

Vice Admiral R.N. Ganesh (Retd.), Adjunct Faculty, NIAS

Saddened to hear this – Arundhati was a sharp thinker and a very successful diplomatic representative who astutely defended our country in international fora for many years – may her soul rest in peace…

Prof. Onkar Marwah, IAS (Retd.)

Very sorry to know about Ambassador Arundhati Ghosh’s passing. I was fortunate enough to have met her. Will forever remember the special UN General Assembly Session on the CTBT in 1996. I was sitting with the US delegation. So, watched her from the other side. She showed extraordinary courage and poise under the circumstances. R.I.P.

Prof. Subrata Ghoshroy, MIT, USA

Ma’am, you will be sorely missed. Rest in Peace.

Gururaj Pamidi, USI

I will miss her very much. Both us had mutual professional respect for each other of the highest order.

Dr. Pallava Bagla

Like scores of younger scholars, Ambassador Ghose was someone I looked upto and was inspired by. I have learnt immensely from my interactions with Amb. Ghose over the past decade or more. I will sorely miss her counsel and her acerbic wit. 

Dr. Arun Vishwanathan, NIAS

Conducting Academic and Policy Research related to National and International Security Issues
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