

substantial shift in such a short period of time runs against the dominant academic literature on the subject. Lastly, if the shift was instigated by the BJP, no policy reversal occurred with the coming of Congress-led government in 2004. In fact, for the entire first term of the UPA, as Walter Ludwig's piece amply demonstrates, the Indian Army was busy perfecting its new doctrinal mandate.

Also, discussion on RMA and its influence is limited. Ahmed largely views it as an organizational incentive. By doing so, he discounts the changing nature of global warfare and its impact on military thinking. Prospect theory suggests that decision-makers are much more influenced by high probability of success compared to high probability of defeat. Did the RMA help instill a belief in the Indian Army that complexities of a limited war could be easily overcome? RMA therefore has to be viewed through a structural lense; not as a mere incentive.

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Explaining Negotiations

Arun Vishwanathan

THE US-INDIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: DIPLOMACY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

By Dinshaw Mistry

Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, 2014, pp. xii+280, ₹695.00

The Indo-US nuclear agreement was a watershed in many ways. First, it led to the de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan and their relations vis-a-vis the United States. The agreement signalled a significant investment by the United States in its relationship with the US. Also, it led to the Indo-US relations being seen as a bilateral relationship rather than from the lens of the American relations with Pakistan, which was how New Delhi historically perceived it. Secondly, the agreement altered, in a significant way, the nonproliferation and export control regime that the US and its allies had put in place following the Indian 1974 nuclear explosion. Thirdly, after decades of isolation, the agreement allowed India to re-engage the international civilian nuclear market.

Though there have been other books on the Indo-US nuclear agreement¹ the book by Dinshaw Mistry is useful and important. One of the significant reasons for this is that Mistry develops a framework for explaining nuclear negotiations. As Mistry correctly points out (p. 4), there is a wide body of literature on explaining nuclear proliferation and countries' rationale behind developing nuclear weapons.² However, recognizing the need for a different explanatory framework for nuclear negotiations and attempting to put forth such a framework is the work's singular achievement.

Another important aspect of the book is the detail which Mistry has gone into while assimilating data on various actors, actions which influenced the negotiations. The data is beautifully condensed into tables and provides useful information on the influence of the media, lobbying activities, expert testimonies in the US Congress and

the like. The data provide important background information and contextualizes the 'wheels within wheels' which were moving to make the agreement a reality.

Mistry explains the Indo-US nuclear negotiations through interplay of diplomacy and domestic factors which include bureaucratic politics, legislative opposition and mobilization by supporter and opponents. This interplay fashioned the broad parameters of 'win sets' of both countries thereby laying down the contours of a 'possible' agreement which would be palatable to both countries and their respective domestic constituents.


Mistry briefly recaps the story of how India and the US got to the historic July 2005 Bush-Manmohan Joint Statement. The two countries traversed through fourteen rounds of Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks, to the November 2002 High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to the July 2004 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) before the initial discussions on widening and deepening the scope of the Indo-US partnership got underway. Mistry has done a good job of capturing the finer nuances of how the July 2005 Joint Statement was finalized given the long history of mistrust on both sides.

Historical tensions and the resultant mistrust has its genesis in the Indian 1974 nuclear explosion and the reaction of the US and the West viz. the Tarapur fuel supply issue. The ghost of the past came back again and again to haunt the negotiations during various phases and shaped the nature of the agreement in significant ways. The story of bilateral negotiations reads like a racy thriller from start to the finish. The July 2005 Joint Statement was itself finalized just a few hours (pp. 54–55) before the two leaders were scheduled to make their public appearance. Similarly, it was in the final days (p. 225) of the Bush administration that congressional approval for the agreement and formalities for nuclear cooperation with India were completed.

The book moves chronologically and progresses along the Indo-US negotiations on the nuclear cooperation. It begins with a background to agreement to the negotiations of the Separation Plan, to discussion in the US Congress and the Indian Parliament, to negotiations on the 123 Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards to securing the NSG exception and finally the securing of approval from the US Congress.

Mistry is able to weave the analytical framework and provide details of the diplomatic negotiations and how they continued to be influenced by various domestic political factors throughout the process. Mistry keeps the eye on the ball and does not deviate from the framework and that is the strength of the book. However, given the focus on the overall framework many of the chapters are structured in a similar fashion down to similar sub-headings. One realizes that it is part of the logic of the book but it does make reading the chapters a little repetitive. However, the quality of the research that has gone into the book and the lucid writing more than makes up for this.

Despite the fact that the Indo-US nuclear agreement was a landmark development in the bilateral relations and witnessed administrations in both countries investing significant political capital to its success, little progress has been witnessed on the ground ten years since the July 2005 Joint Statement. The Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2010 especially provisions relating to liability of suppliers is seen as a major stumbling block.³ However Mistry devotes a paltry four pages to the issue which has poured cold water over all the hoopla surrounding the nuclear agreement and the claims that it would be the panacea for meeting India's future energy requirements. One explanation for this could be that the book largely focuses on Indo-US negotiations, but given the continuing dialogue between the two countries on ironing out the dif-



ferences surrounding the liability legislations more in-depth analysis on the issue would have added value to the book.

¹ P.R. Chari, Ed., *Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism*, Routledge India, New Delhi, 2009.

² For important works on this issue see, Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 171, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981; Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search for a Bomb", *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 54-86; Jacques E.C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007.

³ Anupama Sen and Arghya Sengupta, 'Resolving the nuclear liability deadlock', *The Hindu*, January 6, 2015 available at <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-resolving-the-nuclear-liability-deadlock/article6757524.ece>

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Civil-Military Disconnect

Rajesh Rajagopalan

INDIA'S MILITARY MODERNIZATION: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet S. Pardesi
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 311, ₹950.00

India has one of the world's largest military forces and it is also among the largest military spenders in the world, both in terms of military expenditure and arms imports. Nevertheless, the Indian military faces huge challenges. This is partly the function of the variegated nature of these challenges, fighting in theatres as diverse as the Himalayas, the deserts of Rajasthan and the jungles in Chhattisgarh for the ground forces and equally diverse ones for the other two services. But India's political and administrative systems are also to blame for a confused and confusing approach to every aspect of security policy, from nuclear weapons to counterinsurgency and defence research and production. These problems become even more acute when the current phase of military modernization is taken into account. The growth of the Indian military, a natural consequence of a larger economic pie (the proportion of wealth devoted to the military has remained low and steady), brings these issues into sharp focus. This volume, edited by Rajesh Basrur, Ajaya Kumar Das and Manjeet Pardesi, brings together both scholars and retired military leaders to present a comprehensive picture of the challenges that Indian military modernization faces. The story is one that is almost uniformly depressing.

One of the key problems is the civil-military disconnect that all former service officers pointed out at the end of each of their chapters. The problem itself is well known: unlike in the higher defence

management structure of any other country, the chiefs of the military services are not integrated into the national security decision-making structure of the country except in times of crisis. The reason for this is an exaggerated fear of the military, which is repeatedly stoked by the Indian bureaucracy as a way of ensuring its own grip on decision-making. Admittedly, there is no perfect system of decision-making in any country but the Indian system is designed to be dysfunctional because there is no means for professional advice from the military to be directly sought or given, even on national security matters, to the political leadership. The most famous case is of course in the decision-making regarding nuclear weapons, where atomic scientists, the foreign service, economists and civilian bureaucrats all had say but the military was largely kept out. But it affects other areas too such as defence research and production. Indeed, one of the reasons why both Indian defence research as well as defence production today faces so many challenges is because the services were not well integrated into decision-making on these issues. Weapons were developed, such as the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), more at the behest of the scientific bureaucracy rather than for any requirements set out by the military service for whom the weapons were developed or even in consultation with them. Defence production was judged on the basis of output rather than quality or cost, which left the services with substandard equipment at exorbitant cost.

On the other hand, these problems are well known and even accepted today, with several books having recounted these horrors. It might have been useful for some authors, especially the ones from the services, to provide a slightly more detailed picture of these inadequacies. This could have been attempted through some case studies, even small ones. We know that there have been significant problems with almost every major research R&D effort of the last thirty years: the LCA, the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT), the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), the INSAS rifle system, the Arihant/Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) and many others—the list is unfortunately very long—but there are only dribs and drabs of journalistic heresay about every one of these cases. We have yet to have any detailed account of the decision-making and programme histories of these cases.

Richard A. Bitzinger's chapter on India's defence industry outlines this situation in great detail, pointing out that though India had wanted to move from self-reliance (building weapons in India under licence from foreign manufacturers) to self-sufficiency (building weapons indigenously, without foreign help), this has not happened despite the passage of decades and the wastage of billions of dollars. Even where India co-produced weapons, it is not clear that India has benefited much or contributed much. For example, Bitzinger points out that on the much-touted Brahmos missile, a joint collaboration with Russia, 'India's contribution ..., other than money, is hard to identify.' In essence, even in such projects, Indian defence science and technology has had minimal contribution and such collaborations have not helped India develop its defence R&D or production base either. This suggests that future cooperation, such as on the Russian fifth generation fighter, will also likely be limited mostly to money, and it will not help in developing Indian defence science capacities.

Gurmeet Kanwal, one of India's leading authorities on military and nuclear issues, argues convincingly that India needs roughly about 200 nuclear warheads of fairly small yields given India's stated nuclear doctrine. One can quibble about the numbers, of course, though I find it reasonable, but the real question is if the Indian Government has done such calculations about the numbers of nuclear warheads it needs. This matters because in its absence, nuclear weapons development will continue on auto-pilot without any political

